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Repatriation remains an unsolved problem of Polish migration policy. To date, it has 
taken place on a small scale, mostly outside of the state’s repatriation system. 
Thousands of people with a promised repatriation visa are still waiting to be repatri-
ated. The majority of the repatriates come from Kazakhstan, home to the largest popu-
lation of descendants of Poles in the Asian part of the former USSR. They come to 
Poland not only for sentimental reasons, but also in search of better living conditions. 
However, repatriates—in particular older ones—experience a number of problems with 
adaptation in Poland, dominated by financial and housing-related issues. A further 
source of difficulties for repatriates, alongside their spatial dispersion, insufficient lin-
guistic and cultural competencies, and identity problems, is finding a place on and 
adapting to the Polish labor market. Despite their difficult situation and special needs, 
the repatriates in Poland are not sufficiently supported due to the inefficiency of admin-
istration and non-governmental institutions dealing with the task of repatriates’  
integration. This results in the anguish of repatriation.
Keywords:  repatriation; repatriates from Kazakhstan; Polish integration policy; 
immigration to Poland; Polish minority in the former USSR
Introduction
Over two decades after the beginning of the transformation of the political and 
economic system in Poland, repatriation remains an unresolved issue. Thousands of 
people of Polish origin are waiting in the former Soviet Union with the promise of 
a repatriation visa that will allow them to move to “the homeland.” The existing 
legal and administrative solutions do not allow for the expected scale of repatriation 
or provide appropriate support for those repatriates who are already in Poland.
This article presents an analysis of the migration and integration of repatriates 
moving to Poland from the territory of the former USSR in the context of Polish 
migration and integration policy. The situation of the repatriates will be shown 
against the background of the historical events that led to the presence of Poles in the 
Asian part of the former Soviet Union and, subsequently—as part of the political 
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activities of the Polish state—the possibility of their return to Poland. The factors 
representing barriers to their adaptation in Poland will be outlined, as well as those 
influencing the integration of repatriates. The acculturation strategies adopted by the 
various generations will also be discussed. The article concentrates on Kazakhstan, 
in the Asian part of the former USSR, where the largest number of Poles live and 
from where most repatriates come, due to the tough living conditions there and the 
lack of any previous possibility for return.
The immigration of ethnic Poles from Kazakhstan is worthy of attention as it 
highlights the consequences of Stalin-era forced migrations and the example of a 
wider category of privileged ethnic migration to different, mainly Central and eastern 
european, countries. In recent years, repatriates have been supported, for instance, in 
such states as estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Russia, and, most of all, germany where, 
from 1995 to 2005, 795,000 immigrants were admitted as repatriates.1 Because of 
these high numbers and the efficient integration of repatriates, germany constitutes 
the main point of reference for Polish repatriates, activists supporting repatriation to 
Poland, and Polish researchers.2
Repatriation also represents a larger type of post-Soviet migration. In the case of 
Poland, repatriation as privileged ethnic migration within an institutionalized system 
constitutes only a small part of an intensive ongoing post-Soviet migration to Poland, 
including the individual immigration of people of Polish origin. However, in contrast 
to repatriation, the majority of migration from the former USRR to Poland has a 
temporary (often even short-term) character.
Although, in general, statistics from the last two decades showed limited numbers 
of registered, long-term immigrants officially residing in Poland, post-Soviet 
migrants remained a major immigrant group. Of the approximately 93,000 foreign-
ers with a permit for a fixed period of settlement in Poland included in the Register 
of the Office for Aliens at the end of 2009, the most numerous were Ukrainian nation-
als—almost 27,000 (29 percent), followed by 13,000 Russian citizens (half of them 
Chechen refugees), 8,500 Belarusians, and around 8,000 Vietnamese.
Our analysis of repatriation and the integration of repatriates in Poland will begin 
with some terminological remarks. Repatriation means arrivals in Poland covered by 
a special state policy, with the objective to settle people of Polish origin who, as a 
result of border changes and resettlement, lived prior to 2001 in the Asian part of the 
Soviet Union. In accordance with the binding Law on Repatriation from 2000, “A 
repatriate is a person of Polish origin who arrived in the Republic of Poland on the 
basis of an entrance visa with the objective of repatriation and the intention of per-
manent settlement” (Art. 1). Importantly, on crossing the Polish border, a repatriate 
obtains the status of Polish citizen.
However, the concept of “repatriation” has been the source of debate and doubt. 
For example, Robert Wyszyński3 notes that, with this category of immigrants, there 
is no return to their homeland in a literal sense, because it was “the homeland that left 
them.” As a result of politics and changes in border emplacements, Polish repatriates 
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do not return to the lands of their ancestors, but arrive in their historical and ideologi-
cal homeland. Repatriates to Poland are the descendants of people resettled in the 
east, often those who were born far from Poland, which they do not know. But pro-
posed alternative academic terms such as “return”4 or the “so-called repatriation” of 
Poles from the former Soviet Union5 or even “impatriation” 6 in reference to the 
current phenomenon, have not been widely accepted.
Furthermore, in the media debate on the issue, the term “repatriates,” which is not 
well known in Polish society, is often replaced by “Poles from Kazakhstan.” 
However, the mental shortcut “Poles from Kazakhstan,” which stresses the proxim-
ity and similarity of repatriates, also has negative consequences for the situation of 
this community in Poland. This description evokes connotations related to the stereo-
typical perception of Kazakhstan as a distant, eastern, backward, and poor country. 
It also triggers the expectation that the people of Polish origin will be very similar to 
the modern inhabitants of Poland and have a fluent knowledge of Polish language 
and culture, something that, in the majority of cases, is not fulfilled. Therefore, 
despite the terminological controversies, the concept of repatriation seems to be the 
most appropriate in the context of its reinforcement in public discourse and academic 
research.
Adaptation and integration are two other concepts that need to be clarified before 
we present our analysis. The concept of adaptation is employed to refer to ways in 
which individuals deal with new sociocultural settings and the eventual outcomes 
that occur as a result of related changes. The analysis of adaptation among the repa-
triates from Kazakhstan in Poland draws on Berry’s7 classic fourfold typology, which 
includes the following acculturation strategies:
• integration—when immigrants both maintain their ethnic identity and establish 
relationships with the receiving society;
• assimilation—when immigrants reject their minority identity and maintain relation-
ships with the dominant group;
• separation—when migrants maintain their cultural distinctiveness but not their 
contacts with the receiving society; and
• marginalisation—when immigrants reject both their culture of origin and contacts 
with the receiving society.
The concept of integration is generally used in relation to the participation of repatri-
ates in the different life domains of Polish society. It includes not only relationships 
between immigrants and members of the receiving society, but also an adequate level 
of cultural competence and acceptance of the basic social values, norms, and institu-
tions of the receiving society. As far as the social dimension of integration is 
concerned, Bosswick and Heckmann8 further differentiate between structural inte-
gration (in which the placement of immigrants in social structures related to their 
economic, professional, social, civic, and educational positions, etc. is taken into 
consideration) and interactional integration—that is, the formation of relationships 
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and networks by individuals who share a mutual orientation. The same authors also 
distinguish between cultural integration—the process by which an individual 
acquires the knowledge, cultural standards, and competencies needed to interact suc-
cessfully in a society—and the identification aspect of integration, which refers to a 
feeling of belonging to the dominant society. It is also assumed that a state policy and 
the social attitudes prevailing in the receiving society influence the process of immi-
grant integration, and therefore special integration policies need to be developed and 
implemented.
Background, Estimates, and Description of the Population of 
Polish Origin in Kazakhstan
Before beginning our analysis of immigration to Poland and the integration of 
Polish descendants from Kazakhstan, some historical context for this immigration 
must be presented. The “blurred” boundaries of Poles in Kazakhstan and the politi-
cal aspects of statistics on ethnicity make it extremely difficult to estimate the num-
bers of Polish descendants in Kazakhstan. However, it is worth quoting the estimates 
to get an impression of the scale of the phenomenon. According to census data, in 
1989 Kazakhstan was home to 60,000 Polish nationals and, in 1999, to 47,297.9 
Polish diaspora organizations and researchers place their estimates considerably 
higher. For example, according to data from the website of Wspólnota Polska 
[“Polish Community”], the most important Polish nongovernmental organization 
dealing with the Polish diaspora, there were 100,000 Poles in Kazakhstan in 2007. 
Marek gawęcki,10 a researcher of Kazakh Poles and former ambassador of the 
Republic of Poland in Kazakhstan, also claimed that the official statistical data from 
the USSR need to be corrected by multiplying them by at least 2.0 to 2.5, giving an 
estimated number of Poles in Kazakhstan of between 120,000 and 150,000.
The inflow of Poles to the Asian part of the former Soviet Union began in the 
nineteenth century, when Poles started to be exiled following Russian partition and 
when Polish economic migrants, as well as explorers and scientists, also began to 
arrive in the east. They were joined after the First World War by Polish prisoners of 
war from the Austrian and german armies. But the majority of people of Polish ori-
gin who ended up in Kazakhstan were forcibly displaced persons from the 1920s to 
1940s, due to the plans for Sovietization and collectivization.11 In the 1930s, in par-
ticular, mass resettlement of the Polish population from the Ukrainian and 
Byelorussian SSRs (Soviet Socialist Republics) to Siberia and Kazakhstan took 
place. Deportations were mostly from the border areas of Ukraine (Kamyanets, 
Zhytomyr, and Vinnytsia), to which Poland renounced its claims on the basis of the 
Riga Treaty of 1921. They therefore encompassed an ethnically indigenous popula-
tion with a strong local identity, derived mostly from the lesser nobility and peasants, 
whose sense of distinctness was largely based on their Catholicism and a sense of 
grzymała-Kazłowska and grzymała-Moszczyńska / Anguish of Repatriation 597
connection to the Second Polish Republic. The Soviet government’s plans concern-
ing the Russification of the population and the collectivization of arable farms led to 
the scrapping of the Polish administrative units established earlier and increased the 
repression of the population of Polish origin. As a result, it is estimated that, in the 
second half of the 1930s, a minimum of 250,000 people were resettled to Kazakhstan, 
of whom over 100,000 did not survive their first winter.12
The next great waves of deportation occurred in 1940 and 1941, when around 
320,000 people of Polish origin were resettled from the Polish lands annexed in 1939 
by the Soviet Union to the Kazakh SSR and the northern regions of the Soviet Union. 
From the Polish territories occupied by the Soviet armies at the beginning of the war, 
102,000 Polish citizens were resettled, many of them women and children.13 It was 
possible to evacuate some of these people as a result of the establishment of general 
Anders’s army, and then the Polish army, under the auspices of the Union of Polish 
Patriots.
However, the Polish population resettled in Kazakhstan before the war from the 
Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs were not entitled to benefit from the amnesty 
granted to Polish citizens on the power of the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement of July 
1941. They were also unable to make use of postwar repatriation actions directed 
only at persons possessing Polish citizenship before the Soviet annexation.
The majority of the Poles who remained in Kazakhstan were therefore the descen-
dants of people forcibly resettled there in the 1930s. These people had experienced 
the trauma of deportation and the hardships of life in tough conditions. Those who 
had managed to reach Kazakhstan even after a murderous, several-week journey 
were left to settle in remote areas. They lived in makeshift shelters that they con-
structed themselves. The living conditions they faced were extremely hard owing to 
the climate (temperatures from −40ºC in winter to +40ºC in summer), the backbreak-
ing work in sovkhozes and kolkhozes (state and so-called “cooperative farms”), for 
which the exiles only received a small portion of food and suffered permanent under-
nourishment and dreadful sanitary conditions. Displaced persons were not allowed to 
leave the designated territories without permission. They were under the constant 
control of the local authorities, which compelled them to register with the village 
councils.14
The constant sense of uncertainty and threat broke the exiles’ psyche and left an 
imprint on subsequent generations as, in spite of the end of Stalinism, and even if the 
repressions eased, the supervision did not cease—the means of control simply 
changed.15 The freedom of the deportees and their descendants was still, to a certain 
extent, limited, a fact that was manifested by factors such as impeded access to 
employment and studies, especially in institutions of higher education.
The Soviet authorities also grappled with religion and the Catholic Church, aim-
ing to eradicate any signs of the distinctiveness of the Polish ethnic group and enforce 
the assimilation of its members into Soviet society. Paradoxically, however, this led 
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to a strengthening of the Poles’ faith, and religion became the major—and practically 
the sole—factor preserving the Polishness of exiles in Kazakhstan.16
Some exiles recollect that speaking Polish was forbidden even in private conver-
sations. Others suggest that, although it was possible to speak Polish at home, they 
tended to gradually transfer usage of the Ukrainian and Russian languages from the 
public to the private sphere. Polish culture and language generated mistrust and 
harassment from the authorities. However, the exiles of the 1930s did not manifest 
particularly high linguistic and cultural competence in the Polish culture and lan-
guage.17 In effect, the Poles in Kazakhstan have demonstrated a much lesser knowl-
edge of their native language and culture than other national minorities in the 
country.18 In 1989, only 12.2 percent of people declaring Polish national affiliation 
spoke Polish (a considerably lower percentage than in the other largest ethnic groups 
in Kazakhstan).19 Apart from the complex “original” identity, this was also the effect 
of a policy of de-Polonisation and the natural processes of assimilation (Russification) 
of successive generations of people of Polish origin. Many Poles also married people 
from other ethnic and national groups (e.g., germans), which led to the creation of 
complex ethnic identities in subsequent generations.
In spite of this “loss of Polish culture,” the Polish exiles preserved their identity, 
and their ethnic consciousness began to undergo a resurgence in the 1990s. As 
Wyszyński20 writes, Polish displaced persons in Kazakhstan retained their emotional 
tie to Polish culture, as this was connected with the need both to maintain the most 
primal identity and, more profoundly, to keep their human dignity. On many occa-
sions the attachment to Polishness was brought about by the trauma of deportation, 
which affected entire families.21 In this case the basis of identity was self-definition 
and the will to participate in the community, only sometimes along with Catholicism, 
the practice of language, and the cultivation of Polish customs. ewa Nowicka22 calls 
the identity of Poles in Kazakhstan “residual Polishness,” whereby individuals 
retained only the basic criterion of Polishness—the psychological feeling of being 
Polish, derived from their family histories.
Preservation of the culture was also hampered by the dispersion of Poles in north-
ern Kazakhstan and near Almaty. In the north they lived mostly in the Kokshetau, 
Karagandy, Akmola (Tselinograd), and Kostanay districts. According to the 1970 
census, 64 percent of Poles lived in the countryside although, by 1989, this figure 
was down to 55 percent.23 gawęcki24 even claimed that at least 90 percent of Poles 
in Kazakhstan had worked in kolkhozes or sovkhozes. Relatively few descendants of 
the Poles living in Kazakhstan had received a higher education (working as teachers, 
doctors, engineers), and those who had achieved a high social and professional status 
had become more assimilated or Russified.25 This led to the lack of an intellectual 
elite from which influential leaders involved in issues concerning the descendants of 
Polish exiles in both Kazakhstan and Poland could be recruited.26
After Kazakhstan gained independence, the Polish minority—along with other 
minority groups living there—began to be affected by the enforced policy of 
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“Kazakhization.” As at the threshold of independence, a large proportion of the 
inhabitants of Kazakhstan did not speak Kazakh at all, since Kazakhstan was the 
land of exiles, where intensive Russification took place. For example, under Stalin, 
tens of thousands of germans, Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Koreans, Kalmyks, 
Ingush, Fins, Turks, Kurds, and others were deported to Kazakhstan.27 Only after 
independence did Kazakhs begin to constitute a small majority in the country, as 
a result of the immigration of an ethnic Kazakh population from other CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, China and Mongolia. According 
to Zayonchkovskaya,28 in the period 1991–1997 Kazakhstan received 164,000 repa-
triates of Kazakh origin, among them 93,000 from CIS countries and 62,500 from 
Mongolia. The ethnic composition of Kazakhstan has been also influenced by the 
emigration of other ethnic groups with whom Poles traditionally maintained close 
contacts—for example, germans.29 “Kazakhization” also meant that people of eth-
nicities other than Kazakh were discriminated against, and that the Kazakh language 
became the binding state language. This was compounded by a growth in national-
ism and attacks on “whites” in an attempt to force them to leave Kazakhstan. 
Although the economic level of the lives of urban and rural Poles in Kazakhstan did 
not diverge from the national average after the fall of the USSR, the Polish popula-
tion clearly lost out.30 For example, “Kazakhization” meant that their work situation 
suffered, since the preference of the authorities for the Kazakh population and lan-
guage denied Poles the right to occupy certain positions, and sometimes even to 
perform certain professions. The tough living conditions in a country with an undem-
ocratic political system and restricted civil liberties meant that many people of Polish 
origin wanted to leave the increasingly Asian and Muslim country and move, if not 
to Poland, then to germany, or at least to the european part of Russia.
The nationalization policy was not without influence on the operation of Polish 
diaspora organizations, which, in any case, worked in an anachronous, dispersed and 
limited manner.31 In Kazakhstan there are fourteen district Polish community organi-
zations, concentrated around “Związek Polaków w Kazachstanie” (the Union of 
Poles in Kazakhstan), which has a total of around 3,650 members. However, this 
organization is mainly engaged in education and in documenting the life of the Polish 
diaspora. The political role of leaders of the Polish diaspora in Kazakhstan is too 
small for them to be able to effectively represent the interests of people of Polish 
origin in the country. Furthermore, the Polish community activists are hard for 
younger generations to replace. The three most important nongovernmental Polish 
organizations supporting Poles abroad also concentrate on nurturing Polish tradition 
and culture among Poles in Kazakhstan—these are the aforementioned “Wspólnota 
Polska” and the foundations “Semper Polonia” and “Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie” 
(Aid to Poles in the east).
A particularly important role was played, both in the resurgence and formation of 
the Polish community in the east and in the daily lives of the Polish communities in 
Kazakhstan, by the Catholic Church, although it did not become actively involved in 
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the process of repatriation. The latest studies also show that the Catholic Church in 
Kazakhstan is abandoning ethnically oriented (pro-Polish) activity in favor of the 
construction of a religious and social parish community at a global level (referring to 
the universal teaching of the Church) and a local one (adjusted to local 
multiculturalism).32
The Legal and Institutional Framework  
of Repatriation to Poland
Contemporary repatriation was preceded by the postwar repatriations, which 
lasted until the 1960s and were based on bilateral agreements, subject to particular 
regulations, and enforced by specialized institutions such as the Office of the 
government Plenipotentiary for Repatriation.33 The Law on Polish Citizenship from 
1951 stated that people who had arrived in communist Poland as repatriates were 
Polish citizens. The Law on Citizenship of 1962 not only expressly stated that peo-
ple arriving in Poland as repatriates acquire Polish citizenship by power of law but 
said, furthermore, that a repatriate can also be “a foreigner of Polish ethnicity or 
origin who arrived in Poland with the intention of settling permanently, obtaining 
permission for this from the appropriate Polish authority” (Art. 12, Sec. 2). However, 
this law did not specify the mode of repatriation and the work of the state bodies 
connected to this, and as a result, the acquisition of citizenship by means of repa-
triation in fact remained a “dead” article up until 1989.34
Post-1989, there was increased interest in repatriation among political elites in 
Poland as well as Poles in the east and the immigrants of Polish origin arriving in 
Poland. At that time, too, the positive attitudes of most of Polish society to the 
settlement of Kazakhs of Polish ancestry dominated.35 For example, a 1994 study by 
the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) showed that 39 percent of Poles defi-
nitely and 43 percent somewhat supported the idea that “every person of Polish ori-
gin, if he/she wants to, should receive Polish citizenship and the right to settle in 
Poland.”36 This result was confirmed by research in 1994–1996 by the Centre of 
Migration Research at the Institute of Social Studies (University of Warsaw).37
In effect under the pressure of the “spontaneous” repatriation in the mid-1990s, 
work began on the regulation of this issue, particularly as, at the time, society showed 
a relatively high interest in and support for repatriation. As Sławomir Łodziński 
notes, this was when the fundamental premises of the repatriation system in Poland 
were adopted, “that the nature of the repatriation realized would be individual (repa-
triation will be open to a family which will have essential living conditions assured 
by the commune (gmina), gradual (determined above all by the capacity of the com-
mune budgets) and lasting (it will be a permanent element of the state policy towards 
the Polish diaspora).”38 It was also at this point that work began on the preparation of 
specific legal solutions concerning repatriation, to appear in the first law on 
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foreigners, and which were being prepared at the time. Soon afterwards (in 1997), 
the parliament passed this first law on foreigners, which introduced a special repa-
triation visa (Art. 10) designated for foreigners of Polish ethnicity or Polish origin 
who were intending to settle permanently in Poland.
A major step in the repatriation system in Poland was the Law on Repatriation of 
2000, which continues to be binding today. The law defines a repatriate as a person 
of Polish origin who arrived in the Republic of Poland with a national repatriation 
visa and the intention to settle permanently (Art. 1, Sec. 2). A person of Polish origin 
is perceived as someone who declares Polish nationality and demonstrates a connec-
tion with Polishness—in particular through cultivation of Polish language, traditions, 
and customs—and who has at least one parent or grandparent or both great-grandpar-
ents with (or had in the past) Polish nationality or citizenship. A person arriving in 
Poland with a repatriation visa acquires Polish citizenship through the power of the 
law at the moment of crossing the border of the Republic of Poland. The repatriation 
visa is also granted to minors under the parental supervision of a repatriate, while the 
spouse of an applicant who is not himself or herself of Polish origin but who intends 
to settle in Poland together with the applicant, also receives permission to settle. The 
geographical scope of repatriation was restricted to the territory of the Asian parts of 
the former USSR. Receipt of a repatriation visa was conditional on the repatriate 
having the guarantee of a home and source of revenue for a minimum of twelve 
months. Such guarantees could be given by the local commune or a relative of the 
repatriate. People without these guarantees (but fulfilling the other criteria) received 
a promise of a repatriation visa and were registered on the RODAK (lit. compatriot) 
database, which contains both the names of candidates for repatriation and declara-
tions from local government districts on their readiness to receive repatriates.
The Law on Repatriation of 2000 also made repatriate status obtainable both for 
people of Polish origin from the former USSR who had been living in the Republic 
of Poland before the law came into operation (Art. 41) and for students with Polish 
roots who, before the new law came into effect, were residents of the Asian part of 
the former USRR and who reside in Poland (Art. 16) .
The next law allowing people of Polish origin in the territory of the former USSR 
or those who are stateless in these countries to come to Poland is the Karta Polaka 
(officially called the Card of the Pole) from 2007. This card can be awarded to a 
person who either declares Polish national affiliation, demonstrates a connection 
with Polishness through at least a rudimentary familiarity with the Polish language 
and a knowledge and cultivation of traditions and customs, who has parents/grand-
parents/great-grandparents of Polish nationality or citizenship, or who can demon-
strate his or her active involvement in the promotion of the Polish language and 
culture. Among its benefits are a long-term residence visa, the right to take up 
employment and economic activity in Poland, and access to the free education and 
healthcare system.
Foreigners of Polish origin can also apply for permission to settle in Poland on the 
basis of Art. 52, Sec. 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Holders of the 
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Karta Polaka can also benefit from Art. 52, which gives them a wide range of rights 
similar to those of Polish citizens, with the exception of voting rights. This path is 
sometimes called “hidden” repatriation.39
In 2010, a widely announced civic law bill was submitted to enable the faster and 
easier return to Poland of people of Polish origin deported and exiled by the authori-
ties of the USSR; the bill earned a negative response from the Council of Ministers 
due its high costs. More limited proposals for changes in the repatriation procedure 
are contained in the document adopted by the government in 2012 entitled Polityka 
Migracyjna Polski (Poland’s migration policy),40 among whose postulates are 
changes aimed at accelerating the process of repatriation and increasing its scale (for 
example, by creating stronger incentives for communes to take in repatriates).
The Inflow and Characteristics of Repatriates in Poland
From a historical point of view, the largest postwar wave of repatriation occurred 
immediately after the Second World War on the strength of repatriation agreements 
with the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian SSRs (in 1944) and the govern-
ment of the USSR (in 1945).41 These agreements permitted the repatriation of some 
ethnic Poles and other citizens of Poland who had possessed Polish citizenship 
before WWII and were in the USSR as a result of the war. According to various 
estimates, from 1944 to 1950 between 1.5 and 2 million people returned from the 
USSR to Poland, most of whom came from the Ukrainian SSR. Since only half of 
the people entitled to return did so, the thaw in relations in 1957 brought about a 
further repatriation agreement with the Soviet Union, which led to the return of 
over 250,000 Poles, arriving by 1962, again mostly from Poland’s neighboring 
republics.42
The present third wave of repatriation began with the transformation of the politi-
cal system in 1989, limited in scale by its institutional and legal framework. The first 
stage of repatriation, lasting to the mid-1990s, can be termed “spontaneous repatria-
tion,” as it was mainly based on informal individual or social initiatives.43 The sec-
ond period, from around 1996 to 2000, was the laying of the foundations of an 
institutional repatriation system in Poland. In its first phase, from September 1996 to 
the end of December 1997, 334 repatriate families were invited to settle in Poland—
around 1,290 people in total. Between 1997 and 2010, only 6,223 people overall 
arrived in Poland as a result of repatriation. In the same years, 297 people were rec-
ognized as repatriates on the basis of Art. 109 of the Law on Foreigners of 25 June 
1997; based on Articles 16 and 41 of the Law on Repatriation of 2000, the regional 
authorities recognized a further 734 people as repatriates.44 In total, then, in the 
period 1997 to 2010, some 7,079 people went to live in Poland thanks to repatriation. 
Nevertheless, statistics show a clearly declining trend in repatriation immigration 
since 2001.
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Repatriation via the RODAK system can be deemed a failure. Since the introduc-
tion of the RODAK register in 2001, the number of invitations from communes has 
not exceeded 30 invitations annually nationwide. A combined total of just 190 offers 
from communes and 40 offers from authorities running care homes have been made 
since the regulations guaranteeing subsidies for communes from the state budget 
came into effect.45 In 2010, just twenty invitations were recorded in RODAK. A 
comparison of the number of repatriates settled thanks to this system and the number 
of people who repatriated of their own accord shows that repatriation to Poland has 
a largely individual character. The people who went to Poland on the basis of anony-
mous invitations from the RODAK database (that is, arriving on the basis of the 
individual invitations of a commune) constitute only a minority of the repatriates in 
Poland. In 2005–2009, for example, just 360 repatriates who arrived in Poland did so 
within the framework of the RODAK system, out of a total of 1,411 arrivals during 
this period. According to the RODAK, 1,690 families—over 2,800 people (data from 
August 2013)—are still waiting to settle in Poland, most of them from Kazakhstan 
(55 percent), Uzbekistan (10 percent), and Russia (8 percent), as well as a few fami-
lies from georgia and Kirgizstan.46
The hitherto low scale of repatriation has mostly been the result of the ineffi-
ciency of a system that dumps on communes the responsibility for implementing the 
law. To date, local administrative districts have not had sufficient motivation and 
support in realizing this task. Communes have been discouraged from taking part in 
repatriation by administrative problems, the lack of sufficient financial incentives, 
delays in transferring funds, difficulties in the local labor market, and potential prob-
lems with the integration of immigrants.47
Since 2002, the number of permissions to settle granted on the basis of Art. 52, 
Sec. 5 of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland has risen dramatically. 
Since 2004, this type of permission has increasingly begun to dominate over the 
number of repatriation visas, and in 2010, the difference was more than eightfold. 
Such permissions are granted the most often to people of Polish origin from 
Kazakhstan and Russia, followed by Belarus and Ukraine.
Above all, though, the Karta Polaka fulfils the function of a useful migration 
resource for the inhabitants of those countries neighboring Poland (not only Poles). 
According to data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, up till the end of 2011 the 
number of people receiving the Karta Polaka was 79,684, among whom most (88 
percent) were inhabitants of Ukraine and Belarus. In the Asian parts of the former 
Soviet Union, only 1,693 people received the Karta Polaka—2 percent of all recipi-
ents. The reasons for this are both an insufficient knowledge of the Polish language, 
a lack of information about the Karta Polaka, and difficulties gaining access to con-
sular posts (the descendants of Poles are dispersed and live in vast and somewhat 
inaccessible spaces, whereas the submission of an application requires a personal 
meeting with a consul).48
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Sociodemographic Characteristics and the Distribution of 
Repatriates from Kazakhstan in Poland
The majority of repatriates came to Poland from Kazakhstan (after 2005 they 
constituted over 60 percent of all repatriates). The size of the next largest groups of 
repatriates—from Ukraine and Belarus—decreased steadily until the final applica-
tions submitted before the law of 2000 came into effect. Repatriation was therefore 
restricted to the inhabitants of the Asian parts of the former USSR. It was only after 
this law was passed that small groups of immigrants from Uzbekistan and georgia 
began to benefit from the repatriation program. Since this time, the number of Polish 
immigrants from the Asian part of Russia has remained at a similar level (around 
20–30 people annually).
A large proportion of the repatriates in Poland are of working age. According to 
2001 data from the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, out of the 3,120 repa-
triates or those awaiting repatriation, some 67 percent were of working age (of whom 
41 percent were people aged under 40). The percentage both of the elderly and of 
children and young people was lower than for Polish society as a whole—12 and 21 
percent, respectively. In all age groups (and especially among older people), women 
outnumbered men, in total representing 55 percent of all repatriates.
Based on analysis of Ministry of the Interior and Administration data, Paweł Hut49 
indicated that the repatriates arriving in Poland between 1996 and 2001 were a rela-
tively well-educated group, in which a quarter had received higher education and a 
further 42 percent had at least some form of secondary education. The most numer-
ous professional categories which can be distinguished on the basis of declarations in 
the applications for a repatriation visa were students and school pupils (17 percent), 
artists, specialists (doctors, engineers), and school head teachers (16 percent) and 
manual workers (15 percent). There were around 6 percent each of pensioners and 
unemployed people or those with no pension. Analyses of people registered on the 
RODAK database show that potential repatriates are characterized by their diverse 
education. The most well-educated are young people (partly thanks to Polish scholar-
ships in Poland or Kazakhstan), and the least educated are the oldest (who were often 
unable to study as a result of limited access to education and a lack of funds). Official 
data also confirm generally weak Polish language skills among potential repatri-
ates—familiarity with the language was good or very good in fewer than a quarter of 
cases. Most people on the RODAK database come from the areas with the largest 
centers and level of organization of Poles. The majority of those on the database were 
members of multigenerational families. However, repatriate families often differ 
from the typical family in Poland because of their diversified ethnic origins and 
identities.
Considerable selectivity among the repatriates coming to Poland, accompanied by 
a drain of the elites in the Polish diaspora in the east, can be discerned.50 This is 
partly the result of the policy of the Polish state to support the diaspora and create 
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opportunities for students from the former USSR to settle in Poland. Repatriates 
arriving in Poland are also, above all, those who are able to afford and to organize 
resettlement and help for themselves. Therefore, repatriation, while constituting 
social and demographic potential for Poland, at the same time weakens the Polish 
communities in the east.
The available data indicate a spatial dispersion of repatriates in Poland. Between 
1998 and 2010 the greatest number of repatriates settled in the Mazowieckie (988 
repatriates), Dolnośląskie (774), and Małopolskie (550) voivodeships (high-level 
administrative division). This results both from the number of invitations from com-
munes in the various regions and the preferences of the people organizing their repa-
triation themselves (e.g. repatriate students tend to settle in the places where they 
studied). However, the majority of invitations in the current repatriation system come 
from small places struggling with demographic problems.51 For example, 53 percent 
of the repatriates from Kazakhstan who took part in Hut’s52 postal survey in 2000 
were living in small towns or villages in Poland. The spatial dispersion of repatriates 
and the tendency for them to settle in peripheral locations have an unfavorable effect 
on their adaptation in the country.
The Adaptation Difficulties of Repatriates  
from Kazakhstan in Poland
Bronisław Kozłowski53 distinguished the following main types of adaptation 
problem for repatriates in Poland: sociocultural, administrative, living standards, 
and professional. A similar typology was proposed by Hut54 on the basis of studies 
of repatriates between 1992 and 2000, with a division of problems into formal/legal, 
professional, material/living, sociocultural and climate-related. These results con-
tinue to accurately reveal the main areas of difficulty for repatriates.
Hut55 stressed the role of administrative and legal barriers in the adaptation of 
repatriates in Poland. These difficulties comprise a lack of information and knowl-
edge of regulations by repatriates, and the incompetence of officials, lengthened 
bureaucratic procedures, and problems with implementing repatriation legislation. A 
further problem is the lack of adequate support from state offices and institutions for 
people with insufficient command of Polish. The question of pensions is extremely 
difficult in repatriate families. Owing to the lack of social-insurance agreements 
between Poland and most of the countries of the former USSR, repatriates draw a 
pension from the Polish social insurance institution (ZUS), at the lowest possible 
rate, irrespective of their entitlements in the previous country of residence. even 
worse is the situation for the non-Polish spouses of repatriates, since they are not 
entitled to any pension benefits in Poland.
Another serious problem is the entry and maintenance of repatriates on the labor 
market in Poland, especially in the context of both working conditions in 
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Poland—high unemployment, limited workers’ rights, and low earnings in many 
professions in comparison to the cost of living—and of the frequently low profes-
sional capital of repatriates.56 The work placements offered by communes often 
become invalid or do not live up to promises or the repatriates’ qualifications. 
Another reason for this mismatch is the considerable time gap between the issuing of 
an invitation by the commune and the actual arrivals of repatriates, a gap which 
might be as long as one to two years. Many repatriates, especially the elderly, often 
experience considerable financial problems and extremely poor housing conditions 
(small flats, damaged infrastructure, location in the vicinity of other socially excluded 
people).
According to Kozłowski,57 cultural and social problems are also very important—
that is, repatriates’ low linguistic and cultural competence, and the receiving soci-
ety’s lack of awareness and knowledge of repatriates and the history of the Polish 
diaspora in the east. It should be pointed out that many repatriates have problems not 
only in making themselves understood in Poland due to their foreign accent, but also 
with their lack of general competence in the Polish language and culture. Kość-
Ryżko58 claims that, although the first generation (i.e., the people deported to 
Kazakhstan) usually spoke or at least understood Polish, the second generation, that 
is, the children of exiles, were often not taught the language by their parents out of 
concern to prevent potential discrimination and even penalties for the presentation of 
a “non-Soviet” ethnic identity. For the second and third generations of repatriates, 
Russian was the main language used during childhood—a language that built an 
image of the world and the relations there. The young third generation of repatriates 
had the opportunity to learn Polish either during a holiday camp in Poland organized 
by Wspólnota Polska or during the year preceding the beginning of a degree program 
in Poland. However, in the case of the second generation, the lack of acceptance 
which they experienced in Poland brought them further problems and distress, 
prompting those who did not cope successfully with life in Poland to return to 
Kazakhstan.
Among repatriates encountering discrimination and stereotyping—being called 
“Russkies,” for example—the validity of their national identity is undermined.59 The 
deficit in the social support needed, particularly, in small local communities is an 
important factor making returnees’ adaptation in Poland more difficult. Since the 
1990s there has been less interest in the state’s activities geared towards inviting and 
supporting repatriates, who are sometimes not perceived by local communities to be 
legitimate Poles, their eastern accents and lack of cultural competence and the fact 
that they receive aid from the Polish taxpayer’s pocket, are all pointed out as reasons 
for the lack of interest.60 The disparity between, on the one hand, the expectation that 
repatriates are people who are linguistically and culturally like other Poles and, on 
the other, their “otherness” in terms of culture, mentality, and identity, engenders a 
certain dissonance in the receiving society and can lead to a lack of acceptance of 
repatriates or a questioning of their Polishness.
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The lack of broad social acceptance in Poland means that repatriates cannot easily 
integrate into local communities, which deepens their sense of rejection, loneliness, 
resentment, and yearning for the past (including life in Kazakhstan). They do not feel 
understood but, at the same time, do not take active steps to adapt, integrate and 
search for employment. A further complex issue is that of the repatriates’ identity, as 
they have an awareness of their Polish roots but are somehow lacking a real identity 
shaped under the influence of contact with and immersion in Polish culture.61 In 
addition, the separation of repatriate families and the dispersion of repatriates around 
the country means that, even if they do have relatives or acquaintances in Poland, 
contact with them is rendered more difficult, and they may not be able to provide 
strong support for repatriates. It should be added that repatriates also complain about 
difficulties in bringing the members of their families from Kazakhstan to Poland. In 
addition, repatriates’ expectation that their religious similarity and belonging to the 
Roman Catholic Church would serve as a bridge in their contacts with Poles is usu-
ally hampered by the huge size of parishes in Poland and the subsequent anonymity 
of the individual members of parish communities, as well as the mistrust of many 
Poles of everything associated with Russia, including repatriates’ Russian accent. 
This is particularly consequential considering the insufficient state and nongovern-
mental institutional support system for repatriates.
Apart from this lack of adequate social and institutional support, the preferred 
adaptation strategy expected of repatriates by the receiving society has been one of 
assimilation—that is, the expectation that repatriates would assume the role of peo-
ple returning to their homeland.62 The vast majority of repatriates from Kazakhstan, 
however, were born and raised in a “foreign country.” In fact, they are immigrating 
to Poland, not returning. Assimilation would therefore require a renouncing of their 
past and their connections to Russianness, both important elements of their own 
identity. It therefore seems that this pressure to assimilate in no way helps repatriates 
to find their place or feel “at home” in Poland.
In spite of Polish society’s pro-assimilation attitude, repatriates’ most commonly 
chosen strategy was integration, which allowed them to preserve their previous cul-
ture and language, maintain an emotional connection to the culture of the country of 
origin and, at the same time, acquire knowledge about how to function effectively in 
Poland. Such a strategy appeared all the more often the longer a given person had 
been in Poland. However, integration often led to questioning, by the Polish host 
society, of the authenticity of the repatriate’s Polishness and the legitimacy of their 
being deemed to be a Pole. Such difficulties were particularly clear when people 
from Kazakhstan used Russian on a daily basis and spoke sentimentally of the beauty 
of the places where they had lived in Kazakhstan and of their lives before coming to 
Poland. Clashes between repatriates’ emotions and the attitudes of Polish society led 
some repatriates to adopt a strategy of separation. As a result, they reinforced their 
identification as emigrants from Kazakhstan or people with a Russian identity (in 
terms of culture and Russian language).63 In the case of young people—mostly 
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students—who, in spite of their best efforts, do not feel accepted in Poland but who, 
at the same time, wish to stop being recognized as coming from Kazakhstan, there is 
also a visible process of entrance into the group of international students, thus creat-
ing a third culture that is neither that of the country of origin nor that of the country 
of settlement.64
Final Remarks
The repatriation of people of Polish origin from Kazakhstan continues to be an 
unsolved problem by Polish immigration policy. The existing legal and adminis-
trative solutions are not sufficient for the anticipated scale of repatriation nor do 
they provide appropriate support for repatriates in Poland. The current repatriation 
system is ineffective because of the insufficient activity of the communes on 
which it was supposed to be based. As a result, the scale of repatriation is very 
limited, and the majority of repatriates arrive in Poland individually, outside of the 
official repatriation system. However, only some are able to afford such an under-
taking. Meanwhile, thousands of people are awaiting the opportunity of moving to 
Poland, among them 2,800 who have already received the promise of a repatria-
tion visa.
The repatriation system in Poland therefore needs to change. Not only is repatria-
tion a historical moral obligation for the Polish state, but it also represents Poland’s 
best interests in view of the country’s efforts to curb depopulation of the country due 
to demographic processes. Therefore repatriation to Poland should be streamlined 
and extended. It is particularly important to enable both people who already have the 
promise of a repatriation visa, and the oldest generation of Polish exiles, to come to 
Poland as quickly as possible. The last study by CBOS in 201265 showed that the 
direction which this policy development is taking is generally supported by the 
majority of Poles, who perceive that the Polish government is not sufficiently active 
in this field. Over 78 percent of respondents felt that Poland should allow Polish 
compatriots from the former Soviet Union to work and settle in Poland.
In addition to repatriation, greater support is also needed for the Polish diaspora 
in Kazakhstan in the field of education (through educational programs and scholar-
ships), economic and professional activity, defense of the rights of the Polish minor-
ity, and development of Polish associations in the east. The introduction of 
pre-integration activities preparing repatriates for life in Poland must also be 
developed.
Polish integration policy also requires major changes—to date, it could best be 
described as incorporation “via abandonment.”66 The limited institutional support 
from the state and NgOs, together with the poorly developed immigrant communi-
ties (with rare exceptions), make difficult the adjustment of immigrants to life in 
Poland, especially for those coming from non-european countries. The integration 
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system has been very selective and small-scale—repatriates, together with people 
with refugee (or temporary protection) status, are the only two chosen groups to 
benefit from short-term and fragmentary integration programs. Such negligence of 
integration policy seems to result from the failure by policy-makers to recognize 
emerging ethno-cultural diversity in Polish society and from the conviction that 
Poland is a transit country with a very limited scale of settlement immigration and 
the “unproblematic” immigration of migrants of european origin (mainly from 
european post-Soviet countries and Western europe). The new integration initiatives 
funded by the european Union and the latest legal developments are not directed at 
repatriates.
Whereas, in spite of their beneficial legal situation (possession of Polish citizen-
ship) and relative cultural similarity (in reality often not translating into practical 
cultural and linguistic competence), repatriates from Kazakhstan are a group requir-
ing special support, particularly in terms of their sociocultural and professional adap-
tation in Poland. Repatriates should be assured that they will be given at least the 
basic living conditions, including appropriate integration programs and social insur-
ance for them and their families. The creation of conditions to facilitate repatriates’ 
acceptance by the rest of society, the training of people working with repatriates and 
mobilization of the repatriate community in Poland are also recommended.
The various age groups of repatriates display different needs and necessitate dif-
ferent support. Children and young people starting at Polish schools need psycho-
logical support to help them to cope with culture shock, adaptation problems, and 
even, sometimes, a lack of understanding and acceptance by their peer group. For 
young people beginning their academic education in Poland, an important consider-
ation is career counseling to help with the appropriate selection of a degree program 
with realistic job prospects. effective support—especially job-related and sociocul-
tural—is a particular need of the middle generation of repatriates, who experience 
both problems on the labor market and difficulties in their social and cultural adapta-
tion in Poland. This is because they are often culturally different from Poland’s con-
temporary inhabitants, have varying competence in the Polish language, are 
characterized by a complex ethnic identity and live in ethnically diverse families. 
Problems of a formal/legal nature—often concerning financial and housing-related 
matters, although they concern the whole group of repatriates—affect the oldest peo-
ple in particular (e.g., the problem of repatriate pensions). A barely discernible yet 
important problem, especially for the oldest generation, is their sociocultural recog-
nition and appreciation in Poland.
On the whole, for thousands of Polish descendants from Kazakhstan still wait-
ing for repatriation to Poland and for those who had been repatriated but had failed 
to gain acceptance and sufficient support, and thus to integrate into Polish society, 
repatriation is, instead, associated with disappointment, regret, mortification, and 
anguish. Polish repatriates compare their situation both to that of ethnic germans—
who have been repatriated and supported in germany in great numbers—and to 
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that of the Polish spouses of ethnic germans who have been repatriated with their 
families to germany. ethnic Poles from Kazakhstan, who find living in this Asian 
and Muslim country too difficult but who cannot repatriate to Poland, acquire 
Russian citizenship and escape to Russia. For example, a substantial number of 
ethnic Poles from Kazakhstan who felt that they could no longer wait to be repatri-
ated, moved to the Kaliningrad oblast (an administrative division which is an 
enclave of Russia surrounded by Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Sea) on the 
borders with Poland and lived there in tough conditions, as did the former residents 
of the two typical Polish villages of Jasna Polana and Zielony Gaj in Kazakhstan, 
who settled down in a former kolkhoz in Ozyorsk.67 This contributes to the even 
greater bitterness of Polish repatriates and people of Polish origin who wait for 
repatriation.
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